William James and especially of John Dewey had provided a broad philosophy that attempted to explain the human and social meaning of science and that suggested how the scientific method could be employed to understand and resolve human problems on all levels. Large numbers of American thinkers in many diverse fields began to adopt a more empirical, experimental, and relativistic attitude toward the problems and guiding assumptions of their disciplines. The impact of science and pragmatism, together with the desire for the improvement of man's social and political life that many intellectuals shared, brought new vitality, ideas, and methods to the expanding social sciences.
Through such approaches as functionalism and behaviorism, American psychologists were striving to make their discipline experimental; the new science began to play an increasingly prominent role in the social thought of the twentieth century. By offering to explain the sources and nature of human chology promised to bring the elusive human factor under control an social scientists to make their work wholly empirical. "The importance of the rapid rise of psychology in recent years," explained Edward S. Robinson, a psychologist working with the Yale University Law School, "is that it supplies a background for a natural science of society which has hitherto been lacking."' Because psychology seemed to answer an intellectual need that had grown acute by the twenties, many social scientists turned toward its discoveries and theories with renewed hope and enthusiasm.
Rejecting the prescriptive theories of classical economics, such scholars as Thorstein Veblen and Wesley Mitchell studied production and distribution as problems in the institutional behavior of individuals and groups. "Economics,"
Mitchell declared, "is a science of human behavior."2 Charles Merriam urged his fellow political scientists to apply the discoveries of psychology and the other social sciences to the study of politics, and along with many of his colleagues produced closely detailed studies of the actual operations of governments, politicians, and pressure groups. Bronislaw Malinowski refined techniques of careful observation and description in anthropological field work and developed a theory of society based on the functional interrelationships of all parts of a culture.3
Throughout those disciplines the new empirical, experimental approach emphasized the importance of analyzing social phenomena in terms of functions and behavior.
Along with the primary reliance upon scientific methods came a pervasive epistemological and ethical relativism. Because valid knowledge had to be based on empirical evidence, all a priori absolutes were unproven and unprovable. All knowledge was necessarily tentative and subject to change. Since science supposedly dealt only with objective facts and was morally neutral, the one practically reliable method of reaching truths was inoperative where questions of an ethical nature were concerned. Although a few men such as Dewey maintained that the scientific method could develop and substantiate moral values, most scholars in the interwar decades were not convinced. The empirical documentation of widespread cultural relativism by anthropologists like Ruth Benedict confirmed the relativistic trend, as did the analyses of the nature of historical knowledge by such scholars as Carl Becker and Charles Beard. By the early thirties both Beard and Becker were arguing that historical judgments could never be truly objective because they were based on partial evidence, were not subject to experimental testing, and were warped by the desires and beliefs of the historian. Those beliefs, like all moral values, were wholly particular environment. The power of deductiv absolutes that the method claimed to establish w the actual working of the legal process. By the no metaphysical truths or grand moral princip "natural law," but only "the incidence of the publi tality of the courts." The lawyer's sole duty was to use that force, and hence to advise his clients mos law in empirical, behavioral terms, Holmes urged his colleagues t operations of the law" rather than its phraseology or moral connotatio By the first decade of the twentieth century other scholars were be follow Holmes's lead and to apply the insights of the new scientific, pragmatic outlook. John Chipman Gray, a professor of law at Harvard University, stressed the pre-eminent role of the individual judge as opposed to the logic of the law itself in deciding particular cases. Louis D. Brandeis, and later Felix Frankfurter, argued that judges must consciously consider the probable social results of their decisions. Scientific studies of social needs and problems, rather than syllogistic reasoning, should be the determining factor. To guide the judges in their assessment of those social results, both men employed briefs loaded with a maximum of sociological evidence and a minimum of logical argumentation.7
Much of the theoretical justification for the "Brandeis brief" came from the work of a young law professor at the University of Nebraska, Roscoe Pound, who wrote a series of articles showing the need for and relevance of a new sociological jurisprudence. "The sociological movement in jurisprudence," he explained in I908, "is a movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law."8 Agreeing with Holmes that legal scholars must study the way laws operate in practice, Pound insisted that the overemphasis on logical uniformity and theoretical certainty that characterized much of the older approach often frustrated the just practical settlement of particular cases. Only by studying the social impact of legal principles and rules could men know whether the law in fact brought about the administration of real justice. While Pound and Holmes agreed on many points, especially on the mechanical and abstract nature of the older legal theory, Pound's greater emphasis on the ideal of justice conflicted with Holmes's more cynical view of moral values in the law. Ultimately that difference would be one of the central reasons for Pound's rejection of Holmes's disciples, who were to some extent also his own, in the i93o's.
It was thus in a rigid and formalistic profession that nevertheless had produced a Holmes and a Pound, and in a broader intellectual environment that recognized science as the method of reaching truth, that the so-called legal realists came of age. Of a sample of twenty-two of the most important new critics only five had been born before i88o, while eight were born during the i88o's, and nine after i890. By I930 when their collective efforts were first termed "legal realism" their average age was still only forty-two.9 Thus the realists formed a younger genera-6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., "The Path of the Law," in The Mind and Faith of justice Holmes: His Speeches, Essays, Letters and judicial Opinions, ed. Max Lerner (New York, I943), 72, 76.
7 John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of Law (2d ed., Boston, I963), 99-IOI, I68-73. For the "Brandeis brief," see the account in Robert E. Cushman and Robert F. Cushman, Cases in Constitutional Law (New York, I958), 58o. tion of scholars, less committed to what they rega past and more willing to follow new methods and ideas. Having grown up with the spread of the scientific outlook and the successful growth of the social sciences, they readily accepted a critical, empirical attitude and hoped to apply it to the study of the legal process. Facing the need to discuss the observed facts of judicial behavior, many of the realists turned toward psychological theory for a scientific framework within which to work. The very fact that the new American Law Institute was attempting a "restatement" of the law was an additional factor provoking the new critique. Such a "restatement" assumed that law pre-existed in some whole form that could be discovered by logical analysis and that the job of the American Law Institute was merely to write it down. Most of the members of the institute still believed in the validity of the older juristic method and thought that a more rigorous application would resolve all difficulties. Convinced that law was a human product related to changing social and cultural conditions, the new critics rejected the idea of an official "restatement" as an impossible goal.'4
The practical experience of many of the realists served to strengthen their awareness of the changing and subjective elements in the legal system. The great majority of them had practiced law for at least a year before starting to teach, and they were aware of the many individual, human factors that lay behind the actions of lawyers and judges. They knew firsthand the conflicting and confused nature of many precedents and rules. Such practical experience, as well as their pragmatic outlook, helped lead many of them to hostility toward the older jurisprudence.
Recognizing the need both to understand the actual relationship between law and a changing society and to explain the reasons behind contemporary practice, they began their concerted though diverse probing for a new and scientific jurispru- 
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Because the concepts were empirically empty-they did not bear a definite and constant relation to any concrete reality-they were liable to all kinds of twisting and reinterpreting. In such a way lawyers were able to reconcile completely contradictory judicial decisions as "logical" under the same principle or precedent.
Although he declared that the great majority of men believed in the certainty 
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Radin emphasized the number of conflicting rules that pertained to any
In such a situation the judge was forced to decide cases on an expectation of their probable social results. Since that meant a reliance on the judge's subjective value standards, the process was actually a matter of personal motivation. "Judges, we know, are people," Radin commented, and they thus make their decisions like all other people.33 Yntema made the point even more explicitly: "The ideal of a government of laws and not of men," he maintained, "is a dream."34 The subjective motives of the judge, not the existence of rules, or even constitutions, provided the key to understanding the law.
Morris R. Cohen, a philosopher at the City College of New York and a leading critic of realism, pointed to the antidemocratic implication of such a judicial theory. "To be ruled by a judge," Cohen declared, "is, to the extent th he is not bound by law, tyranny or despotism."'35 When the realists claimed that the judge's subjective decision was the only law, he implied, they were justifying judicial despotism.
At that point, the theoretical force of the realist critique became clear, for it rejected any concept of a higher law that could provide judges with objective, rational guidance to assure a just operative law. A pervasive scientific relativism that seemed to undermine any objective or absolute moral standard underlay the realist approach. Llewellyn and Frank had both assailed abstract logic and deductive rationalism and scorned the absolutes that those approaches generated. These two fundamentally irreconcilable attitudes were in large part responsible for the intensity and extremism in the debate. Since both sides started from widely divergent assumptions, they were often unable to understand, let alone sympathize with, their enemy's position. The realists saw rational absolutism as pointless and often subjected it to ridicule and scorn. Felix Cohen referred to it as "Transcendental Nonsense," while Arnold and Frank compared it to superstitious incantations chanted by witch doctors and faith healers. The rational absolutists returned the scorn in full, charging the realists with everything from atheism to Communism to nihilism. As the realists were often unable to understand how anyone could accept some of the canons of rational absolutism in light of the discoveries of modern science and philosophy, their critics were equally unable to see how any man could fail to accept that which was selfevident and necessary to give support to a universally valid ethical system. Such a system was necessary, they continually insisted, if men were to condemn totalitarianism rationally. With each side committed to its own obvious truths and faced with an implacable opponent, vilification and the questioning of motives became an almost automatic recourse. Those who would not see must have some hidden and unworthy purpose.
That deep division was also evident in the awkward positions taken by Pound, Fuller, Morris Cohen, and a number of other critics of realism. Such scholars knew the severe limitations of deductive logic and were committed to some form of legal empiricism. At the same time, however, they saw many of the theoretical problems realism created, and they agreed, when faced with the challenge of totalitarian ideology and practice, that some supralegal moral standard was necessary as the basis for ethical judgments. Torn between two conflicting attitudes, they tried desperately to reconcile them or to develop a coherent ethical position that would withstand the criticisms from both sides.
Fuller's concept of natural law, for example, placed him distinctly outside the realist movement, but failed to bring him into any real philosophical agreement with the Thomists. It was too abstract foir the one side and too positivistic for the other.
The long debate also clearly revealed the plight of ethical theory in the middle of the twentieth century. The incisive criticisms of modern philosoph dramatic impact of experimental science had made rational absolutism in the minds of most educated Americans. Many were ready to conclu moral justification in any ultimate sense was an impossible and meaningless concept. "Having surrendered the quest for certainty," Cook insisted, quoting Dewey, "we can offer no guarantees."'71 Though difficult to deny intellectually, that conclusion was dissatisfying to most Americans at the time when Nazism was perpetrating its outrages on both Germany and the rest of Europe.
The apparent success and spread of the totalitarian ideologies, backed by While ignoring some of its more extreme theoretical tendencies, the profession generally accepted many of the ideas associated with legal realism. That movement helped establish the importance of factual research in law, the necessity of empirical studies of the legal process, the legitimacy of a more flexible constitutional interpretation, and the acceptance of a pragmatic, operational concept of law. In spite of the problems the realists presented, both philosophically and legally, they were pointing toward the future by suggesting fruitful courses of study and more useful methods of analysis. The alliance the realists helped forge between legal theory and empirical analysis fortified the trend toward sociological jurisprudence that had begun forty years before and that was to become a commonly accepted part of American law in the years after the Second World War.
